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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
Doclcet No. 36466-2009

SIRIUS LC, a Wyoming Limited Liability Company,
PlaintiffiRespondent,
VS.

BRYCE B. EFUCKSON, AND ANY PERSON CLAIMING UNDER, BY OR THROUGH
BRYCE H. ERICKSON IN AND TO THE REAL PROPERTY DESCRIBED AS FOLLOWS:
TOWNSHIP 5 SOUTH, RANGE 46 E.B.M., SECTION 27: LOTS 1 AND
2, N%NW%,EXCEPT THEREFROM THE S%NEl/NWl/NWl/,

RESPONDENT'S BHEF

Appeal from the District Court of the Sixth Judicial District for Caribou County.
Honorable Don L.Hardig i Mitchell brow^, District Judge, Presiding.
A. Bruce Larson, Esq.
ABLE LAW PC
Attorneys at Law
155 South 2ndAve.
P.O. Box 6369

Bryan D. Smith, Esq.
B. J. Driscoll, Esq.
Smith, Driscoll & Associates
P. 0 . Box 50731
414 Shoup Avenue
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405
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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

A. Nature of the Case
This is an action brought by Sirius LC ("Sirius"), a Wyoming Limited Liability
Company, to enforce a Promissory Note (also "Note") and to foreclose a real estate Mortgage
executed by Bryce H. Erickson ("Ericltson"). The Mortgage encumbered real property located in
Caribou County, Idaho. Erickson admits that he executed the Promissory Note and that he also
executed the Mortgage but denies that he is obligated to pay the amounts due and owing on the
Promissory Note. The reasons for Erickson's refusal to pay are based upon the affirmative
defenses raised by Erickson in his responsive pleadings.

B.

Course of Proceedings 1 Statement of Facts.

1. Procedural Historv.
Sirius LC, a Wyoming Limited Liability Company, filed a complaint to enforce a
Promissory Note and to foreclose a real estate Mortgage. The Note and Mortgage were executed
by Bryce H. Erickson on November 13, 1999. The Mortgage secured the Promissory Note and
encumbered real property located in Caribou County, Idaho.
The terms of the Promissory Note required that Erickson would pay Sirius $29,173.38
together with interest at the rate of 10% per m u m . Ericltson failed and refused to pay the
Promissory Note which led to the action seeking foreclosure of the Mortgage. Erickson filed a
on for s u n q judgment challenging the validity of the Note and Mortgage. The motion
ed Answer. The

11. As a separate and further defense, Defendant alleges that there was
inadequate and insufficient consideration to support the purported
agreement between the parties. (emphasis added)
Clerk's Transcript Sirius I (R. p. 24); Sirius v. Erickson, 144 Idaho 38, 156 P.3d 539, 62 UCC

The District court denied Erickson's Motion for Summary Judgment and alternatively
granted Summary Judgment to Sirius. Erickson moved for reconsideration. At issue on
reconsideration was the District Court's ruling and whether there were any genuine issues of
material fact regarding Erickson's other affirmative defenses. Erickson did not file additional
affidavits to establish material issues of fact in support of the other affirmative defenses, nor did
Erickson submit any other factual information relating to his initial claim of failure of
consideration. The Motion for Reconsideration was denied. Erickson filed an appeal,
This Coud upheld the ruling of the District Court that there was consideration for the
Promissory Note and Mortgage holding:

"In this case, Erickson requested Bagley's representation in a Chapter 12
proceeding. Bagley agreed to represent Erickson if he would sign a promissory
note payable to Sirius, secured by a real estate mortgage. Erickson requested
Bagley's representation for his own benefit and signed the promissory note at
issue in anticipation of receiving such benefit. The record establishes that Bagley
agreed to, and did, represent Erickson in his Chapter 12 bankruptcy proceeding,
so Erickson received the benefit for which he bargained. Certainly, a party cannot
execute a promissory note, let it default, and then escape the consequences of his
promise by defending on the ground of lack of consideration after he has received
the benefit of his bargain. See Daniels v. Englehart, 18 Idaho 548,551, 111 P. 3-4
(1910) (the maker of a note cannot receive consideration, and at the same time
successfully resist the payment of the obligation). Tl~us,the promissory note does
not lack consideration because Bagley gave consideration for the note when he
represent Erickson in ex
UCC Rep.Serv.2d 41 1 (2007).

However, this Court vacated the holding of the District Court relating to the other
affirmative defenses raised by Defendant Erickson. The matter was remanded to the District
Court for further proceedings relating to Erickson's affirmative defenses. The matter was tried
before the District Court sitting without a jury on June 30 and July I, 2008. Following the trial,
Sirius and Erickson each submitted additional arguments and authorities. The District Court
entered judgment in lavor of Sirius on September 30,2008. Sirius timely filed a Memorandum of
Costs and Attorney Fees. Erickson did not file an objection to the Memorandum of Costs and
Attorney Fees. The attorney for Erickson agreed that Sirius was entitled to the award of costs and
fees as the prevailing party and that the fees requested were reasonable. (Tr. Motion for
Reconsideration p. 2, L 21-23). Erickson filed a Motion for Reconsideration, or in the
Alternative, for New Trial. The Motion was denied and Ericlcson filed this appeal.

2. Parties to the Action.
Sirius LC is the Plaintiff in this action. Bryce Erickson is the Defendant. William
Bagley ("Bagley") is not a party to the action. Bagley is a Wyoming attorney who represented
Erickson and lus now ex-wife in Chapter 11 bankmptcy proceedings in Wyoming during their
divorce proceedings in Wyoming. Erickson has made no attempt to join Bagley as a party or
ask leave to allow a third-party complaint against Baglcy. Erickson has had a full and fair
opportunity to litigate any issues involving Bagley's conduct in the Federal Bankruptcy Court in
the state of Wyoming. However, Erickson has raised a number of affirmative defenses relating to
Bagley's conduct during his representation of Ericltson in bankruptcy court in an attempt to
avoid the foreclosure of a Promissory Note and Mortgage by Sirius. None of the affirmative
defenses involve any conduct or acts on the part of Sirius. The affirmative defenses are all based

Bagley's representation of Erickson took place before Erickson again solicited Bagley's legal
representation for a later Chapter 12 bankruptcy action.
The facts are undisputed that Bagley's legal representation of Erickson commenced
sometime during the year 1998 and tenninated on June 6, 2000. All of the representation took
place in the State of Wyoming. Erickson was at all material times a resident of the state of
Wyoming. Ericlcson, subsequent to the termination of Bagley as his lawyer, filed a motion in the
Chapter 12 bankruptcy case challenging the Promissory Note and the security of the Mortgage.
The motion, entitled "Motion for Release of Mortgage to Secure Payment of Promissory Note to
Sirius LC", contained many of the same factual allegations that were later used as a basis for the
affirmative defenses now being pursued by Erickson in Ibis action. (P's Ex. 17). The Wyoming
bankruptcy judge ruled that the relief requested in the motion was denied and that in order for
Erickson to avoid the lien of the Mortgage it would be necessary to file an adversary proceeding
in the Bankruptcy Court. The Wyoming bankruptcy Judge also held: "These minutes constitute
the court's official order in this matter;" (P's Ex. 18).
Erickson did not file the adversary proceeding in the Bankruptcy Court nor did he make
any further challenge to the ruling of the Court which denied the relief he sought in the
bankruptcy action. Judith A. Shively ("Shively"), a Wyoming bmkmptcy attorney, was retained
by Erickson to represent him in the Wyoming Chapter 12 proceeding. Shively was also called as
a1 "expert witness" and testified at the time of the trial in this matter. Shively testified that the

issues regarding the effectiveness of Mr. Bagley's representation of Erickson or whether he
committed malpractice could have been heard in the Wyoming Bankmptcy Court and, in fact,
were "core" issues in the b

3. Admitted Facts.

Erickson stipulated that Sirius had proven its case. At the beginning of the trial in this
matter, Erickson's attorney made several admissions and stipulations which conclusively
established that Sirius had met its burden of proof as to all of the material allegations of the
Complaint. Ericltson's attorney admitted and stipulated as follows:

MR. SMITH: So it just seems to me, Your Honor, that they haveprevailed on
their case because they have established as a matter of law the promissory note.
They have established my client hasn't paid and it just seems to me, Your
Honor, they have alreadyput on their case by virtue of that." (Emphasis added)
(Tr. P 4, L 15-17).
"Your I-Ionor, I am even willing to go farther given the ruling by the Supreme
Court. I am willing to stipulate that they have proven their case and we are here to
put on our affirmative defenses."
(Tr. Vol. 1, pp. 5,6 L 2- 1-3).

"MR. LARSON: Your Honor, we are prepared to go forward with Mr. Smith's
idea. And as I understand it, they are admitting our case has been proven. They
are admitting to the numbers in the promissory note. They are admitting that the
mortgage is valid, the note is valid, and all of the other material issues that are ill
our complaint. And would admit those have been found in our favor, except they
have their affirmative defenses to go forward on.
THE COURT: That is my understanding. Is that correct?

MR. SMITH: That is correct, Your Honor. That is correct. He says they are valid.

resolved by a Marital Property Settlement Agreement ('"Divorce Settlement"). ( P's Ex. 3). The
Divorce Senlement specifically referred to fees owed to Mr. Bagley. The Divorce Setllement
provided that Erickson would pay those fees. Erickson agreed in his testimony at trial that the
issue concerning attorney fees was part of what was-reviewed by the independent attorney
representing Ericlcson in the divorce. (Tr. Vol. 11, p. 43, L 12-25). Erickson also testified that he
understood that all of the information regarding debts was to be disclosed in the Divorce
Settlement. (Tr. Vol. 2, p. 42, L 17-25). Erickson admits in his testimony that he had a full
understanding of the Note and Mortgage at the time that he executed the documents. Erickson
testified that he was not complaining about what Mr. Bagley did for him i'n the Chapter 12
banlmptcy proceeding. (Tr. Vol. 2, p. 50, L 1-25, p.5, L 11-21),
4. Affirmative Defenses.
Erickson's Amended Answer included thirteen affirmative defenses, for which he had the
burden of proof on the elements of each. During the trial Erickson presented evidence that
focused on Bagley's legal representation and the amount Bagley charged for his services during
the Chapter 11 proceeding in Wyoming. Erickson used his affirmative defenses as a springboard
to bringing what amounted to a third-party malpractice claim against Bagley in the Idaho District
Court.

11. ADDITIONAL ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL.

4.

Did the Wyoming Bankruptcy Court have exclusive jurisdiction to determine the

claims relating to William Bagley?

5.

Does the doctrine of "res,judicatanbas Bryce Erickson's claims against William

Bagley?

6.

Does the doctrine of "judicial estoppel" bar Bryce Erickson's claims against

William Bagley?

7.

Does the doctrine of "the law of the case" prevent Bryce Erickson from

challenging the basis of consideration for the promissory note?

8.

Does the doctrine of "the law of the case" prevent Bryce Erickson from

challenging the amout of the promissory note?

9.

Did the District Court err in allowing William Bagley to testify as an expert

witness?
10.

Is Sirius entitled to the award of attorney fees in accordance with the terms of the

parties agreement and pursuant to Idaho Code 512-120 (3)?

111. ARGUMENT.
A. Standard of Review.
This Courl recently stated the following in the case of Borah v. McCandless, 147 Idaho

Co., 119 Idaho 946,949,812 P.2d 253,256 (1991)). Since it is the province of the
trial court to weigh conflicting evidence and testimony and to judge the credibility
of witnesses, this Court will liberally construe the trial court's findings of fact in
favor of the judgment entered. Rowley v. Fuhrman, 133 Idaho 105, 107, 982 P.2d
940, 942 (1999). This Court will not set aside a trial court's findings of fact unless
the findings are clearly erroneous. Ransom v. Topaz Mktg., L.P., 143 Idaho 641,
643, 152 P.3d 2, 4 (2006); I.R.C.P. 52(a). If the trial court based its findings on
substantial evidence, even if the evidence is conflicting, this Court will not
overturn those findings on appeal. Benninger, 142 Idaho at 489, 129 P.3d at 1238.
Additionally, this Court will not substitute its view of the facts for that of the trial
court. Ransom, 143 Idaho at 643, 152 P.3d at 4. This Court exercises free review
over matters of law. Bolger v. Lance, 137 Idaho 792, 794, 53 P.3d 1211, 1213
(2002) (citing Bouten Constu. Co. v. HF. Magnuson CO., 133 Idaho 756, 760, 992
P.2d 751, 755 (1999))." Borah, 205 P.3d 1209, 1214. "A trial court's findings of
fact will not be set aside on appeal unless they are clearly erroneous. When
deciding whether findings of fact are clearly erroneous, this Court does not
substitute its view of the facts for that of the trial court." Thomas v. Madsen, 142
Idaho 635, 637, 132 P.3d 392, 394 (2006), "It is the province of the trial court to
determine ... the inferences to be drawn from the evidence." KMSI: LLC v. County

ofilda, 138 Idaho 577,581,67 P.3d 56,60 (2003)"
Bird v. Bidwell, 147 Idaho 350, 209 P.3d 647, 649, 650 (2009). The District Court properly
exercised its descretion in the conduct of the case and trial. The District Judge ruled properly
applied its findings to the legal principles that controled the action.

Erickson. The facts are undisputed that the legal representation commenced sometime during the
year 1998 and terminated on June 6, 2000. The representation took place in the State of
Wyoming during the time that Erickson was a resident of that state. Erickson filed a motion in
the Wyoming Bankruptcy Court challenging the Promissory Note and the security of the
Mortgage.
Idaho Code (j 5-5 14 provides:
Acts subjecting persons to jurisdiction of courts of state.-- Any person, firm,
company, association or corporation, whether or not a citizen or resident of this
state, who in person or through an agent does any of the acts hereinafter
enumerated, thereby submits said person, firm, company, association or
corporation, and if an individual, his personal representative, to the jurisdiction of
the courts of this state as to any cause of action arising from the doing of any of
said acts...
The transaction of any busiiiess within this state which is hereby defined
(a)
as the doing of any act for the purpose of realizing pecuniary benefit or
accomplishing or attempting to accomplish, transact or enhance the business
purpose or objective or any part thereof of such person, firm, company,
association or corporation.
(h)

The commission of a tortious act within this state; ..."

This Court has held: "Implicit in a jurisdictional question such as this are two issues whether the acts alleged fall within the acts enumerated by the statute, and whether the assertion
of jurisdiction would violate the defendant's right to due process of law." Akichika v. Kelleher,
96 Idaho 930, 539 P.2d 283 (1975). The court in Akichika determined that a transaction between

e state of a Idaho to allow jurisdiction under the st

he transact business within the state of Idaho. Erickson is not a resident of the state of Idaho. All
of his dealings with Bagley took place in the state of Wyoming. Damages, if any, to Erickson
would have occurred in the state of Wyoming. The legal representation and other acts claimed to
have been committed by Bagley occurred within the state of Wyoming. The state of Idaho does
not have subject matter jurisdiction or personal jurisdiction over Bagley. Erickson relies on his
affirmative defenses as a basis to litigate a third-party claim against Bagley. Bagley was not
served with process or joined as a party to the action, nor was he allowed an opportunity to
respond to the allegations in the appropriate forum.
The action of Sirius to foreclose a mortgage is equitable in nature and the plaintiff is riot
entitled to a jury trial nor is the defendant who raises only affirmative defenses entitled to a jury
trial. In Grausz v. Englander, 321 F.3d 467, (2003), the Court discussed ihe right to a jury trial in
a lmnkruptcy proceeding holding that a case may be tried before a bankruptcy judge and a jury
with the authorization of the district court and the consent of the parties. See 28 U.S.C.

5 157(e).

In any event, an adversary proceeding may be transferred to the district court if a jury trial is
required. See In ve Stansbury Poplar Place, Inc., 13 F.3d 122, 128-29 (4th Cir. 1993).
The District Court was correct in its determination that Erickson was not entitled to
ground his aKirmative defenses in Bagley's conduct during prior representation. Erickson had not
challenged the status of Sirius as a separate entity. The claims against Bagley should have been
properly pled as a third-party complaint which would require Erickson to serve process on

,the state of Idaho does not h
process nor did he have an o

to respond as a party to all

representation in a state of Wyoming. Erickson, by his admission that Sirius has proven its case,
cannot challenge the legal status of Sirius as an independent entity.
C. Law of the Case / Adequacy of Consideration.

The issues relating to the determination of whether or not there was consideration for the
Note and Mortgage have been determined by this Court. That determination estops Erickson
from now arguing different reasons or presenting additional evidence oflack of consideration.
The atlenlpt by the Defendant violates the 'law of the case' doctrine. The 'law of the case'
doctrine provides that when "the Supreme Cow, in deciding a case presented states in its
opinion a principle or rule of law necessary to the decision, such pronouncement becomes the
law of the case, and must be adhered to throughout its subsequent progress, both in the trial court
and upon subsequent appeal." Swanson v. Swanson, 134 Idaho 512,515,5 P.3d 973,976 (2000).
As a matter of law, the issue of consideration has been determined in this case and the holding is
clear. Sirius v. Erickson, 144 Idaho 38, 156 P.3d 539, 62 UCC Rep.Serv.2d 41 1 (2007).
This Court, in its previous decision relating to this case, conclusively determined that
there was consideration for the Pron~issoryNote and Mortgage delivered by Erickson to Sirius.
Erickson obtained the benefit of his bargain. The holding is tantamount to determining that the
consideration is adequate, "A promise for a promise is adequate legal consideration to support a
contract." Eastern Idaho Production Credit Association v. Placerton, Inc., 100 Idaho 863, 606
P.2d 967 (1980); citing: Caldwell v. McKenna, 54 Idaho 552, 33 P.2d 366 (1934); Knack v.

The Restatement (Second)

I
I

I

a gain, advantage, or benefit to the promisor or a loss, disadvantage, or
(a)
detriment to the promisee; or
(b)

equivalence in the values exchanged; or

(c)

'mutuality of obligation.' "

The Restatement (Second) of Contracts

5

79, Adequacy of Consideration; Mutuality of

Obligation
"Comment c." following

5

79 clearly illustrates the concept of adequacy under

circumstance on point with the facts of this case.
c. Exchange of unequal values. To the extent that the apportionment of productive
energy and product in the economy are left to private action, the parties to
transactions are free to fix their own valuations. The resolution of disputes often
requires a determination of value in the more general sense of market value, and
such values are commonly fixed as an approximation based on a multitude of
private valuations. But in many situations there is no reliable external standard of
value, or the general standard is inappropriate to the precise circumstances of the
parties. Valuation is left to private action in part because the parties are thought to
be better able than others to evaluate the circumstances of particular transactions.
In any event, they are not ordinarily bound to follow the valuations of others.
Ordinarily, therefore, courts do no1 inquire into the adequacy of consideration.
This is particularly so when one or both of the values exchanged are uncertain or
difficult to measure. But it is also applied even when it is clear that the transaction
is a mixture of bargain and gift. See Comment c to 5 71. Gross inadequacy of
consideration may be relevant to issues of capacity, kaud and the like, but the
requirement of consideration is not a safeguard against imprudent and
improvident contracts except in cases where it appears that there is no bargain in
fact.
The Restatement (Second) of Contracts $ 79, Adequacy of Consideration; Mutuality of
Obligation; "Comme

This Court's Decision is consistent with the Restatement. Once
there was no need to opine o

quacy of the consideration.

prior to signing the Note and Mortgage but that he in fact forgave Bagley. (Erickson depo. pp.
52-55). The facts are undisputed that Bagley filed the Chapter 12 petition for Erickson and that
he was allowed lo represent Erickson for a period of time in the Chapter 12 proceeding. The
Defendant specifically states that he did not have any complaint with Bagley's representation in
the Chapter 12 proceeding. (Tr. Vol. 11, p.51 L 18-21).

D. Other Affirmative Defenses /Fraud.
Defendant Erickson has the burden of proof on each of the affirmative defenses lo present
facts that the Plaintifr Sirius claim for relief is subject to the defense. The entire presentation of
Erickson focused not on the actions of Sirius but of a non-party, Bagley. Erickson has not met
his burden. The defenses are dealt with separately as follows:

1. ". .. the note and the mortgage uDon which the alaintiffs Comulaint are based were and
are voidable because of unlawful acis committed in violation of the Idaho Consumer Protection

&"Erickson's affirmative defense of a violation of the Idaho Consumer Protection Act
("Act"), Idaho Code

$5 48-601 et seq., are inapplicable. The Act, by its definition, applies only

to trade or commerce withii the state of Idaho. The Act provides that "'[tirade' and 'commerce'
mean the advertising, offering for sale, selling, leasing, renting, collecting debts arising out of the
sale or lease of goods or services or distributing goods or services, either to or from locations
within the state of Idaho, or directly or indirectly affecting the people of this state." I. C. $48602(2). Erickson claims that a11 acts he ascribes to Bagley took place in the state of Wyoming.
hibits unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of trade or commerce

Wyoming and no part of the transactions referenced in any manner by the Defendant Erickson
took place in the state of Idaho.
2. ". . . plaintiffs claims are barred because Defendant acted under duress." None of the
elements of the duress or coercion have been shown nor any proof submitted to the Court which
would support the defense against the Plaintiff.

Idaho and Wyoming law is clear. The

Wyoming Supreme Court held: "A party must also present evidence showing that he was
coerced by wrongful conduct. Bare allegations that these circumsta~~ces
existed, without
specifics showing their existence, are not sufficient." Pittard v Great Lakes Aviation, 156 P 3d.
964, WYSC 05-230 - 042407 (2007). Idaho law is virtually the same and holds: Duress
"includes that condition of mind produced by the wrongful conduct of another, rendering a
person incompetent to contract with the exercise of his free will power." Goodman v. Lothrop,
143 Idaho 622, 151 P.3d 818 (2006) (citing) Inland Empire Refineries v. Jones, 69 Idaho 335,

Erickson's testimony clearly refutes that Bagley either coerced him into signing the Note
and Mortgage or that he was under such econo~nicdistress that he had no other alternatives.
Erickson's deposition was admitted as Plaintiffs Exhibit 9. The deposition testimony clearly
establishes that he was not coerced into entering into the transactio~lwas Sirius. (Erickson depo.
pp. 25-26, L 10-25 and 1-4).
3. ". .. plaintiff is estooped from asserting the claims herein." Absolutely no proof was
presented that would support the affmative defense of estoppel.

4." ... plaintiffs claims are barred by the fiaud." Erickson's claims of fraud, as a matter
of law, are barred in that he has failed to plead the elements of fraud with particularity. Idaho law

defense or as a counterclaim, the circulnstances constituting fraud must be stated with
particularity in the pleading. I.R.C.P. 9(b); Theriault v. A.H Robins Co., Inc., 108 Idaho 303, 698
P.2d 365 (1985). The elements of fraud are: (1) a representation of fact; (2) its falsity; (3) its
materiality; (4) the speaker's knowledge of its falsity; (5) the speaker's intent that the
representation will be acted upon in a reasonably contemplated manner; (6) the listener's
ignorance of its falsity; (7) the listener's reliance on the truth of the representation; (8) the
listener's right to rely on the truth of the representation; and (9) the listener's consequent and
proximate injury. Stvate v. Cambridge Telephone Co. Inc., 118 Idaho 157, 795 P.2d 319, (1990).
Regardless of any other circumstance relating to the affirmative defenses, any reliance on fraud
or misrepresentation was not proven by clear and convincing evidence at the time of the trial.
5. ". .. plaintiff failed to mitigate its damages, and that any and all damages, as alleged bv
the plaintiff, which are expressly denied, resulted from said failure to mitigate damages."
Absolutely no proof of failure to mitigate was presented at the time of trial.

6. "... the note and the mortgage upon which the plaintiffs Complaint is based were and
are invalid and therefore any action based won them is barred by invalidiQn Absolutely no
proof was presented at the time of trial showing the invalidity of the note and mortgage. In fact,
Erickson agreed that Sirius had proven its case as to the validity of the Note and Mortgage.
7. "... the note and mortgage upon which plaintiffs Complaint is based were and are
illegal and plaintiffs Comulaint is barred by said iIlegalitv." Absolutely no proof was presented
at the time of trial showing the invalidity of the Note and Mortgage. In fact, Erickson agreed that
Sirius had proven its case as to the validity of the Note and Mortgage. Erickson and his attorney,
Judith Shively, during the course of the Chapter 12 proceeding, had a full and fair opportunity to

bankruptcy court in Chapter 12 proceeding challenging the Note and Mortgage. The motion was
dismissed and the Defendant and Shively failed to follow the bankruptcy court's order directing
the Defendant to file an adversary proceeding.

8. "... the Comolaint and each and everv separate cause of action contained therein is
barred in whole or in Dart by reason of olaintifk unclean hands." Erickson failed to present any
evidence at the time of the hearing that would support his defense of unclean hands against
Sirius.

9. "... there was inadequate and insufficient consideration to support the ourported
agreements between the parties." Ericlcson has failed to address the issues relating to
insufficiency or inadequacy of consideration and has presented no argument or proof directed to
this affirmative defense. The law of the case established consideration. Further, Erickson
stipulated that Sirius had proven its case
10." ... the agTeement may not be soecifically enforced because the assent of Defendant to
the agreement was given under the influence of mistake, misaourehension or sururise." No proof
was presented by Erickson that he was under the influence of mistake, misapprehension or
surprise. In fact his testimony was to the contrary.
11.

". ... the Complaint and each and every seoarate cause of action contained therein

is barred in whole or in part by the doctrine of undue influence." Absolutely no proof was
presented by Erickson at the time of trial that the doctrine of undue influence applied or that
Erickson signed the Note and Mortgage because of undue influence.
Erickson claims that the affirmative defenses are supported by claims for professional
neglige~~ce,
breach of fiduciary duty, violation of the Idaho Consumer Protection Act, unjust

properly set off against the Plaintiffs claims in this case. (P's Ex. 8). Rather than being a mere
affirmative claim of an offset for a sum of money, the determillation of whether an offset exists
requires the District Court to conduct a trial concerning legal representation that occurred in the
state of Wyoming at a time when Erickson and Bagley were residents of the state of Wyoming.
The affirmative defenses, by this process, are expanded into a full-blown third-party claim
against Bagley, who is not a party to this action, and then somehow transforming the resolution
of that third-party case into a setoff against Sirius.

E. Judicial Estouuel 1Res .Iudicata.
Erickson and his attorney, Judith Shively, who represented Erickson in the Chapter 12
proceeding, failed to disclose the malpractice claims against Bagley or any other claim against
him as an asset of the bankruptcy estate. However, Shively did file a motion in the Chapter 12
proceeding dealing with the issues surrounding Bagley's fees and the Note and Mortgage. (P's
Ex.17). The bankruptcy judge entered an order denying the motion. (P's Ex. 18).

In fact,

Shively testified at trial that she had the expertise to file an adversary proceeding involving the
same issues that were raised in the motion, that Bagley would have been subject to the
jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court and that the issues involving the attorney fees and
malpractice would have been considered core issues in a bankruptcy proceednlg. (Tr. Vol. 11,
pp.220 -223)
Erickson could have and should have challenged the order of the Bankruptcy Court and
raised these issues in that court. Judicial estoppel precludes a party from gaining an advantage by
taking one position, and then seekhg a second advantage by taking an incompatible position.

Sword v. Sweet, 140 Idaho 242,252,92 P.3d 492,502 (2004). Loomis v. Church, 76 Idaho 87,

277 P.2d 561 (1954). Robertson Supply, Inc. v. Nicholls, 131 Idaho 99, 101, 952 P.2d 914, 916
(Ct.App.1998).
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has pointed out that a debtor seelcing shelter under
the hanlcr~~ptcy
laws is required to disclose all assets, or potential assets, to the bankruptcy court
under 11 U.S.C. $ 521(1), and 541(a)(7). Burnes v. Pemco Aeroplex, Inc., 291 F.3d 1282, 1286
(1 lth Cir.2002). Full disclosure is '"crucial to the effective functioning of the federal bankruptcy
system." Id. Because both creditors and bankruptcy courts rely on the accuracy of the disclosure
statements, the Court concluded, "the importance of full and honest disclosure cannot be
overstated." Id.
Responding to the debtor's arguments of lack of both privity and prejudice, the Court
noted that judicial estoppel protects the integrity of the judicial system, not litigants, so numerous
courts have held that "[wlhile privity and/or detrimental reliance are often present in judicial
estoppel cases, they are not required." Id. Additionally, parties asserting judicial estoppel are not
required to demonstrate individual prejudice since courts have concluded that the doctrine is
intended to protect the judicial system. Id.
While Idaho appellate courts have applied the doctrine of judicial estoppel in a nunber of
cases, the courts have not dealt with a situation where the first proceeding from which a party
later tales an inconsistent position in a bankruptcy proceeding. The Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals provides guidance in a similar case, Hamilion v. Sfate Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 270 F.3d
778 (9th Cir.2001).
Hamilton brought suit against State Farm for bad faith and breach of contract after the
insurance company refused to pay his claims relating to alleged acts of theft and vandalism.
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had filed for bankruptcy. Id. at 781. Hamilton's bankruptcy schedules listed the vandalism loss
against his estate but failed to list the corresponding claims against State Farm as assets of the
estate. Id. State Farm filed a motion to dismiss I-Iamilton's claims against the insurance company
and the motion was granted based upon the doctrine of judicial estoppel. This decision was
affirmed on appeal. Id. at 782.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals cited the following rule regarding application of the
doctrine:

"

In the bankruptcy context, a party is judicially estopped from asserting a cause of

action not raised in a reorganization plan or otherwise mentioned in the debtor's schedules or
disclosure statements." Hay v First Interstate Bank of Kalispell, NA., 978 F.2d 555, 557 (9th
Cir.1992) (failure to give notice of a potential cause of action in bankruptcy schedules and
Disclosure Statements estops the debtor from prosecuting that cause of action); In re Coastal

Plains, 179 F.3d 197, 208 (5th Cir.1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1117, 120 S.Ct. 936, 145
L.Ed.2d 814 (2000) (holding that a debtor is barred from bringing claims not disclosed in its
bankruptcy schedules); Payless Wholesale Distributors, Inc. v. Alberto Culver (P.R.) Inc., 989
F.2d 570, 572 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 931, 114 S.Ct. 344, 126 L.Ed.2d 309 (1993)
(debtor who obtained relief on the representation that no claims existed cannot resurrect such
claims and obtain relief on the opposite basis); Oneida Motor Freight, Inc. v United Jersey

Bank, 848 F.2d 414, 419 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 967, 109 S.Ct. 495, 102 L.Ed.2d 532
(1988) (debtor's failure to list potential claims against a creditor 'worked in opposition to
preservation of the integrity of the system which the doctrine of judicial estoppel seeks to
protect,' and debtor is estopped by reason of such failure to disclose). A&J ConstPuction Co.,

Inc, v. Wood, at 141 Idaho 682,116 P.3d 12 (2005).

The claim is also precluded by the doctrine of res judicata. "[A] valid and final judgment
rendered in an action extinguishes all claims arising out of the same transaction or series of
transactions out of which the cause of action arose." Diamond v. Farmers Group, Inc., 11 9 Idaho
146, 150, 804 P.2d 319, 323 (1990). In addition, in an action between the same parties upon the
same claim or demand, the former adjudication concludes parties and privies not only as to every
matter offered and received to sustain or defeat the claim but also as to every matter which might
and should have been litigated in the first suit. C Systems, Inc. v. McGee, 145 Idaho 559, 181
P.3d 485 (2008) . The unchallenged order denying Erickson's motion challenging the validity of
the Note and Mortgage became final.
The malpractice claim arises from Bagley's representation of Erickson in the Wyoming
Bankruptcy Court. Defendant Erickson's malpractice claim is barred by the doctrine of res

judicaia in that the malpractice claim should have been brought in the bankruptcy action as part
of an adversary proceeding challenging the Note and Mortgage which are the subject matter of
this action. An adversary proceeding brought by a debtor to asserl a malpractice claim against his
bankruptcy lawyer is a case that falls within a bankruptcy court's core jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. $ 157. See In re Southmark, 163 F.3d 925, 930-32 (5th Cir. 1999)(emphasis added).
Erickson's motion in the bmkmptcy proceeding challenging the Note and Mortgage as being
either a preference or prepetition attorney fees in the Chapter 11 proceeding. The issue of
malpractice or issues relating to the attorney fees of Bagley or other defenses to the Note and
Mortgage should have been raised in the bankruptcy. Grausz v. Englander, 321 F.3d 467, (2003)
holding: ("This is a professional malpractice action filed by a Chapter 11 debtor against the law

fm that represented him in his bankruptcy case. We hold that the district c o w had bankruptcy

bankruptcy case. In addition, we affirm the district court's award of summary judgment to the
law firm because the malpractice claim is barred on res judicata grounds by an earlier order of
the bankruptcy court").
Therefore any affirmative defense based upon the claim of professional malpractice
on the part of Bagley or any defenses to the Promissory Note and Mortgage are barred by the
doctrine of res judicata. The issues were within the core jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court and
the action should have been prosecuted by the Defendant in the bankruptcy proceeding. As a
matter of law, any affirmative defense that should have been brought in the bankruptcy action is
barred as a defense in this proceeding.
Erickson challenges the reasonableness of Bagley's attorney fees in the handling of the
Chapter 11 proceeding. However, by way stipulation at the beginning of the trial, Erickson
agreed that the numbers and calculations in the Note were correct. Erickson testified that llis
Marital Settlement Agreement with his former wife provided that he would pay the attorney fees
to Mr. Bagley. Erickson was represented by an independent attorney during the divorce
proceeding and he admits that he reviewed the settlement with that attorney.
The agreement specifically states: "Each party asserts that he or she has made a fhll and
fair disclosure of all of the property of any nature whatsoever belonging in any way to each of
them, and of dl debts and encumbrances incurred in any manner whatsoever by each of them.
Such disclosures are part of the consideration made by each party for entering into this
agreement."
At the time of trial, Erickson testified to the effect that he was unaware that he was
paying all of the fees charged by Bagley for his representation of Erickson's wife. Based upon

knew that he was receiving a benefit from agreeing to pay all of the attorney fees to Bagley
through the Divorce Settlement. Erickson now claims those fees are unreasonable after he
received the benefit oftheir value.
The Federal Bankruptcy Judge recognized in its order dated June 6, 2000, that: "The
divorce of the Erickson's may impact the extent to which the claim is valid against the estate."

Mr. Bagley testified at the hearing that he fdly disclosed the amount of his fees, including an
accounting of the $5,000.00 payment, to the Defendant in his ofgce in Wyoming and they both
agreed that the amount was correct. Erickson does not dispute those assertions. Bagley also
testified that his legal representation allowed the time necessary to complete the ultimate goal of
the chapter 12 and Chapter 11 proceedings, i.e. time to sell the real property.
The trustee, in its report to the Chapter 12 Bankruptcy Court, confirmed that at least three
years were necessary to market and sell the property based upon the circumstances surrounding
the sale.(P1sEx. 19). Even if the issue of the reasonableness of Bagley's attorney fees in the
Chapter 11 proceedings is relevant to this action under the circumstances, it is clear that they
were in fact reasonable and not out of line with the comparable charges made by Ms. Shively for
her limited representation in the Chapter 12. (P's Ex. 26,)(Tr. Vol. I, p. 218, L 19-25, p. 219, 18).

F. Expert Witness Testimony.

1. Erickson's Witness.
Erickson's expert witness, Judith Shively, is one of Erickson's attorneys. She represented
him in the Chapter 12 proceeding. Shively is an interested person in the outcome of this
litigation. Ms. Shively, among other things, consciously chose not to pursue resolution of the

issues relating to Bagley's fees, the Mortgage, the claims of setoff, conflict, unreasonablei~essof
fees and malpractice against Bagley in the bankruptcy proceeding. In fact, many of the claims
were not disclosed to the bankruptcy court. The bankruptcy court ordered Erickson to file an
"adversary proceeding" in order to challenge the Mortgage. Shively's decisions prevented the
proper determinations from being made in the bankruptcy proceeding.
Ms. Shively's fees for handling three minor amendments of the Chapter 12 plan exceeded
$24,000. (P's Ex. 26). She then advised Erickson in her capacity as his anorney on how to
respond to the complaint in this action. She also directly contacted Sirius' attorney and sought
an extension of time to respond. During this time, all of the issues and facts which form the basis
of the affirmative defenses could have been litigated in the bankruptcy court. All of the
necessary parties were within the jurisdiction of the Wyoming Bankruptcy Court. I-Ier actions
resulted in a substantial amount of attorney fees ($24,000 and climbing) being expended in state
court litigation on issues that should have been resolved in the federal bankruptcy court.
"Bias is a term used in the 'common law of evidence' to describe the relationship
between a party and a witness which might lead the witness to slant, unconsciously or otherwise,
his testimony in favor of or against a party. Bias may be induced by a witness' like, dislike, or
fear of a party, or by the witness' self-interest. Proof of bias is almost always relevant because the
jury [or, in this case, the trial judge], as finder of fact and weigher of credibility, has historically

been entitled to assess all evidence which might bear on the accuracy and truth of a witness'
testimony." United States v. Greenwood, 796 F.2d 49 (4th Cir.1986).
Shively collected fees in excess of $24,000 in the Chapter 12 bankruptcy. (P's Ex. 26).
Without any explanation of the reason, Shively filed three amended plans in order to successfully

Erickson, that being to allow time to sell a portion of the property and pay all of the creditors.
Between Shively and Ericltson's attorneys in Idaho, large sums have been spent to resolve an
issue that could have been more efficiently handled in the bankruptcy action.
The expert witnesses' testimony is biased and she advocates as an attorney on the part of
the Defendant. Shively clearly has a conflict of interest in fulfilling her role as a zealous
advocate and providing court with an unbiased "expert" opinion as contemplated by the Idaho
rules of evidence. Shively's trial testimony established that she did not have the expertise to
determine damages. (Tr. Voi. I. p. 39 L 12-21). The District Court allowed Shively to testify that
some of Erickson's creditors were awarded attorney fees, however there was no foundation
showing why those fees were attributable to any act of Sirius or that the fees would not have
been incurred in any event.
2. Waiver of Objection to Baglev's Testimony.
Erickson's attorney took the deposition of Willianl Bagley on April 25,2008. During the
deposition, inquiry was made concerning the expert opinions of Bagley. The questions were
directed at specific actions taken during Bagley's representation of Erickson in the Chapter I I
proceeding in Wyoming. The inquiry also elicited Bagley's opinions relating to the "standard of
care" in his representation of Erickson and the reasonableness of the fees charged by Bagley.
(Bagley depo. p.67, 111, 113, 114, 159) Erickson's attorney and expert witness, Shively, was
present at Bagley's deposition. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 70 L 7-17). The deposition of Bagley in its entirety
was introduced as an exhibit at trial during Erickson's case in chief. Ericlcson relied heavily upon
the deposition testimony at the time of trial. Erickson objected prior to allowing Bagley to testify
as an expert claiming that he had not been disclosed by Sirius as an expert in that he had been

Erickson cannot dispute that he had a full opportunity to discover Bagley's opinions. Erickson
cannot dispute that he used Bagley's opinions as a part of his case and there is no basis to restrict
Bagley's testimony in response to the evidence presented at the time of trial by Erickson. Clearly,
Erickson has waived any objection to the testimony of Bagley relating to his opinions, and at the
time trial.

G. Conflict of Interest.
Rule 1.8 of the Rules of Professional Conduct is the same for the states of Idaho and
Wyoming. The Rule was not violated by Bagley. Furthermore, Sirius is not subject to the
assertion that violation of an ethics rule by an outside party somehow voids the Note and
Mortgage. During the transaction in question, the Defendant was represented by an independent
attorney who reviewed the fee charged by Bagley and included a provision for its payment as a
secured debt in the Divorce Settlement. (Plaintiffs Exhibit "3")(Tr. Vol. I, p. 42 L 11-25 p. 1-25)
Comment 4 to Rule 1.8 is conclusive on the issue. It states:
[4] If the client is independently represented in the transaction, paragraph (a)(2) of
this Rule is inapplicable, and the paragraph (a)(l) requirement for full disclosure
is satisfied either by a written disclosure by the lawyer involved in the transaction
or by the client's independent counsel. The fact that the client was independently
represented in the transaction is relevant in determining whether the agreement
was fair and reasonable to the client as paragraph (a)(l) further requires.
I.R.P.C. Rule 1.8, Comment 4.
The trial judge determined that Erickson was represented by an independent attorney and
that he had reviewed with that attorney the fact that the debt involving attorney fees would be
secured. (Tr. Vol. 11, 45 L 7-15). Erickson also testified that he had a full understanding of the
Note and Mortgage. (Tr. Vol. 11, p. 51 L 1-16).

The District Court found that Erickson did not file an action against Bagley in the
bankruptcy court, the state courts of Wyoming, a claim in the Idaho proceeding or file a
complaint against Bagley with the Wyoming Bar Association. The Defendant testified that he
had no complaint with Mr. Bagley's representation of him in the Chapter 12 proceeding. (Tr.
Vol. 11, p. 51 L 18-21). The filing of the Chapter 12 proceeding is the consideration for the Note
relied upon by the Idaho Supreme Court in Sirius. The "law of the case" doctrine establishes that
)

what happened prior to that time regarding Mr. Bagley's representation of the Defendant in the
Chapter 11 proceeding is not the relevant inquiry. The only relevant issue relates to filing the
Chapter 12, a fact that was determined to have occurred by this Court. Sirius v Erickson, 144
Idaho 38, 156 P.3d 539,62 UCC Rep.Serv.2d 41 1 (2007).
Defendant claims that Bagley should not collect attorney fees because of a number of
conflicts of interest he claims arose during the course of representation. Defendant claims that a
conflict of interest arose when Mr. Bagley undertook the representation of Defendant's former
spouse Kathleen Erickson in a companion Chapter 11 case. The purpose of filing Kathleen's
bankruptcy was not materially adverse to either of those individuals. Defendant and his wife
were both represented by separate attorneys who referred them to Mr. Bagley for the purpose of
filing the Chapter 11 cases. The representation provided by Mr. Bagley was exactly what the
Defendant had requested to stop the foreclosures that were facing the Erickson's. The ultimate
goal both of the Ericlcsons sought was to sell a sufficient amount of property to pay off their
debts, realizing that there was significant equity in the property to allow a plan to work.
Erickson and his wife were in the process of divorce and their interests were resolved by
the Divorce Settlement. The Divorce Settlement specifically referred to the fees owed to MI.

Defendant agreed in his testimony that the issue of the attorney fees was part of what was
reviewed by his independent attorney. Defendant also acknowledged that he understood that all
of the information regarding debts was to be disclosed in the Divorce Settlement. Erickson
claimed that Bagley's representation of his wife in the Chapter 11 proceedings created such a
conflict that he could not continue with Erickson's representation. The rules of professional
conduct apply to circumstances where the attorneys ability to represent the client is materially
adverse to the interests of the client. The comment applicable to the rule states: "A conflict of
interest exists if there is a significant risk that the lawyer's ability to consider, recommend or

cany out an appropriate course of action for the client will be materially limited as a result of the
lawyer's other responsibilities or interests. For example, a lawyer asked to represent several
individuals seeking to form a joint venture is likely to be materially limited in the lawyer's ability
to recommeild or advocate all possible positions that each might take because of the lawyer's
duty of loyalty to the others. The conflict in effect forecloses alternatives that would otherwise be
available to the client." Rule 1.7 Wyoming Rules of Professional Conduct comment [8].
The Wyoming Supreme Court dealt with the issue of defining what amounts to a conflict
of interest. The Wyoming Court focused on the concept of whether or not the claimed conflict
would be "materially adverse". In the case of Simpson Performance Products, Inc. v. Horn, 92
P.3d 283, 2004 WY 69 (Wyo. 2004) that Court held: "However, the question of whether
representation is "materially adverse" to a former client becomes less clear in situations like the
present, where the former client, although not directly involved in the litigation, may be affected
by it in some manner. Under these circumstances, we must make a case-specific inquiry to
determine the degree to which the current representation may actually be harmful to the former
client. (citation omitted) "This fact-intensive analysis focuses on whether the current

representation may cause legal, financial, or other identifiable detriment to the former client.
(citation omitted) Additionally, we must determine "whether the attorney's exercise of individual
loyalty to one client might hann the other client or whether his zealous representation will induce
him to use confidential information that could adversely affect the former client."
William B. Bagley's representation was not materially adverse to the Defendant at any
time during his prosecution of the Chapter 11 proceedings or in his negotiations with creditors
after the Chapter 1I had been dismissed. Mr. Bagley's representation of the Defendant in the
Chapter 12 proceeding was equally not materially adverse to the Defendant. Defendant testified
that he was satisfied with Mr. Bagley's representation of him in a Chapter 12 proceeding. He
agreed to and acknowledged in writing Mr. Bagley's representation after Mr. Bagley had
disclosed in writing the adverse interest. (Tr. Vol. 11, p. 50, L 6-10).

N.ATTORNEY FEES.
I. Costs and Fees Awarded by the District Court.
The District Court in a judgment on September 30, 2008, awarding among other things
cost and attorney fees to Sirius. Pursuant to the provisions of I.R.C. P. 54(d)(5), Sirius filed a
Memorandum of Cost and Fees within 14 days after the judgment was entered. Erickson did not
file a11 objectioil to the Memorandum of Costs and Fees. The failure to file the objection
constituted a waiver of all objections to the costs and fees. I.R.C. P. 54 (d)(6); Great Plains

Equipment, Inc. v. Northwest Pipeline Corp., 136 Idaho 466,36 P.3d 218 Idaho (2001). Erickson
agreed that the fees and costs were reasonable and the District Court entered its Order
Determining Attorney Fees on December 5, 2008. Erickson has waived any objection to the
award. Sirius is the prevailing party. In addition, the Note and the Mortgage provide that

Erickson "agrees to pay all expenses of collection including a reasonable attorney's fee". (P's Ex.
1 and 2). I. C. 512-120 (3) provides for the award of attorney fees involving transactions.
2. Costs and Fees on Apgeal.
Sirius based upon the agreement contained in the Note and Nortgage and the provisions
of I.A.R. 4land Idaho Code 512-120(3) is entitled to an award of attorney fees on appeal.

V. CONCLUSION.
The District Court's findings relating to Sirius's case are supported by substantial
evidence. Erickson agreed that Sirius had proven its claim and that the amount claimed in the
Promissory Note was correct. The District Court's conclusions of law are supported by
substantial evidence in the case. The claims raised by Erickson against Bagley were not proven
to be effective defenses against the claims of Sirius. The de facto third-party claim against
Bagley fails due to lack of jurisdiction of the court to try the mafler of Bagley's misconduct, res
judicata based upon the Order of the Bankruptcy Court and the doctrine of judicial estoppel. The
doctrine of the law of the case prevents Erickson from litigating the issue surrounding
consideration for the Note and Mortgage. The same doctrine precludes Erickson ffom
challenging the amount of the Promissory Note.
Erickson had a Eull opportunity to discover all of the knowledge and opinions held by
William Bagley relating to his legal representation of Erickson in the federal bankruptcy court.
The deposition testimony of Bagley was submitted to the trial court as a part of Erickson's case.
That testimony was considered by the trial court. Erickson's presentation of the deposition
testimony as evidence results in a waiver of any objection to Bagley testifying as an expert at the
time of trial. The District Court did not commit a reversible error by allowing the testimony. The

District Court was also within its discretion in giving less weight to the expert called by
Erickson. The expert was an attorney representing Erickson and also responsible for not pursuing
Erickson's claims against Bagley regarding his legal representation in the federal bankruptcy
court in Wyoming.
Based upon the terms of the Note and Mortgage, I.A.R. 41 and the provisioils of Idaho
Code $12-120(3), Sirius is entitled to an award of attorney fecs.Sirius respectfully requests that
this Court affirm the decision of the District Court.
Dated thispday

of December 2009.
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